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Introduction
1 Ethno-racial categories are composed of many groups.1 That is why the Latino community
has  been described  as  heterogeneous.  Yet,  the  Latino  identity  operates  socially  in  a
cohesive manner in the US because of internal and external factors. The internal factors
are historical in the sense that people in Latin America have a common language that, in
spite of national and regional differences, allows for the sharing of cultural goods, ideas
and worldviews. They share this cultural heritage because they share a common history
of  colonization  by  Spain.2 Colonization  and  fights  for  independence,  along  with  a
complicated relationship with the US that has always perceived the western hemisphere
as its zone of influence, have brought a sense of commonality in many Latin American
countries.3 And in the US, as Douglas Massey and Magaly R. Sánchez have shown in their
book Brokered Boundaries, people of Latin American origin have faced an external force in
the form of an anti-immigration discourse that explains, in part, their sense of identity as
a community:
“For  Latin  American  immigrants  in  the  United  States  today,  the  processes  of
assimilation and identity formation are unfolding within a context characterized by
an  exceptional  degree  of  anti-immigrant  framing  and  immigrant-isolating
boundary work. The tail wagging the dog is undocumented migration.” (Massey and
Sanchez, 2010, p. 24)
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2 Therefore there is such a thing as a Latino community. And this community, at the mass
level, has distinct policy concerns (Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Fraga et al., 2007).
Immigration is only one of many issues but it carries “tremendous emotional weight and
is inevitably tied to these other issues” (Rouse 2016,  p.  45).  That is why immigration
remains a rallying cry for Latinos and crucial policies such as the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) represent great mobilization tools (Barreto and Collinwood
2015). These internal and external factors help explain why scholars have identified a
“Latino vote” (DeSipio 1996; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; García 2012; Barreto and Segura
2014).
3 But while a lot has been written about the Latino community and its role in American
politics there remain some misconceptions. Some of them are the idea that the Latino
vote  could  be  equated  with  a  Catholic  vote  or  that  Latinos  have  reached  such  a
demographic level that they have become an electoral giant. While this statement may be
true locally, it is far from being the case nationally because of such factors as their
geographical  concentration,  low  citizenship  rate  and  even  lower  turnout.  Besides,
important  presidential  election  swing  states,  such  as  Florida,  provide  a  contrasting
picture. However, there appears to be a long-term trend in which Latino numbers are
increasing  in  many  parts  of  the  country  and  help  elect  more  Latinos  into  office.
Moreover,  Latinos  are  changing  American  politics  because  they  tend  to  prefer  the
Democratic Party. Far from disproving the salience of the Latino vote, the election of
Donald Trump might actually reinforce the confluence of racial and partisan polarization.
 
1 - The Potential Impact of the Latino Vote
4 A persistent misconception about Latinos is that they are an electoral giant. While this
may be true locally in a city like Los Angeles, it is not the case nationally, at least not yet.
The Latino community has become a demographic giant and at the same time, at the
national level, it is still an electoral dwarf. While in 1980 the Latino population comprised
only 14.5 millions, according to the census, in 2015 it represented almost 18% of the US
total population.4 Estimates also indicated that of the 57 million Latinos in the US in 2016,
27 millions were of voting age, that is about 16% of the electorate (Griffin et al. 2015). Yet
only about 17 million Latinos were estimated to register to vote and less than 14 million
were actually expected to vote in 2016 (NALEO 2016). Actually, according to the Current
Population Survey, a grand total of 12.7 million Hispanics (of any race) voted in 2016 out
of 15.2 millions who registered, for total voting age population of 26.6 million.5 These
were disappointing numbers for the community.
 
The Latino Vote : Toward More Polarization?
Revue de recherche en civilisation américaine, 7 | 2017
2
Figure Estimate of total Latino electorate, NALEO
5 In 2016 the Latino Voting Age population was estimated to represent 12.5% of the total
voting age population. But the registered number of Latinos only represented 10.4% of
the total registered population and the number of Latinos projected to vote was only 10%
of the American electorate going to the polls. 
 
Figure Estimated Latino electorate impact as percentage of general electorate
6 To put it differently, projections estimated that about 12 million Latinos would not vote
in 2016. This makes Latinos by far the largest reservoir of votes in the US that both major
parties should try to tap into, especially since Latino numbers keep increasing in total
numbers and as a share of the electorate. In that sense, Latinos represent the future of
American politics. And the battle over this untapped potential should drive both major
parties  agenda  for  the  foreseeable future.  Over  the  past  20  years  the  GOP
instrumentalized anti-immigrant, and anti-Latino sentiment for local electoral gains but
demographics  suggest  that  this  strategy  is  becoming  more  dangerous  and
counterproductive with each election cycle (Robinson et al. 2016).
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Figure 3 Estimate of total number of Latinos not voting, in millions 
7 Indeed this steady increase in the Latino vote has the potential to be very impactful in the
context of other groups’ decrease in total votes. Except in 2016, for the first time since
1980, the Euro-American share of the electoral did not decrease (it remained at its 2012
level of 73%).6
 
Figure 4 Net Vote Evolution per Race/ethnicity, in thousands. Source: Community Survey
Population
 
2 - The Structural Constraints of the Latino Vote
8 What are some of the reasons that explain the relative weakness of the Latino community
as a voting group? First, to be eligible to vote, one needs to acquire US citizenship. Many
Latinos  were  born  abroad,  even  if  that  percentage  is  decreasing.7 In  2014,  27.7% of
foreign- born Americans were born in Mexico. 35% of the Latino population (19 million
people) were born outside the US while 65% were born in the US (36 million people). The
foreign-born rates for other ethno-racial groups were 4% for Euro-Americans, 8.6% for
African-Americans and 67% for Asian-Americans (Brown and Stepler 2016).
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Figure 5 Percentage of foreign-born Latinos, US Census
9 In 2015 74% of Latinos eligible to become US citizens decided to naturalize. That is the
highest percentage of naturalization among Latinos in 2 decades. However, only 42% of
Mexicans opted to do so. A historically high mark for that community but still very low to
really have an impact on the electoral process (Gonzalez-Barrea, 2017).
10 The second reason for this low electoral impact is that one needs to be 18 years old to be
eligible to vote in the US and the Latino community is on average much younger than the
rest of the population or other ethno-racial groups (Patten 2016).  Figure 8 shows the
median age according to race/ethnicity.
 
Figure 6 Median age by racial/ethnic group
11 The fact the Latino population is on average younger than the rest of the country means
that fewer people are over 18 years of age and therefore eligible to vote. However, when
they are above 18 years old Latino minors are on average younger than minors in the rest
of  the population.  According to the Pew Research Center the vast majority of  Latino
youths  (93% of  them)  are  U.S-born citizens  and therefore  will  automatically  become
eligible to vote once they turn 18. It is estimated that every year about 800,000 Latinos
turn 18.  By  2030,  this  number  could  grow to  1  million per  year,  adding a  potential
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electorate of more than 16 million new Latino voters to the rolls by 2030 (Taylor et al.
2016).
 
Figure 7 2016 estimate of generation percentage in electorate by 
12 In 2016, however, millennials represented the single largest cohort of eligible voters for
the Latino community (Krogstad 2016). This has important electoral consequences since
young people register and turn out at much lower rates than older people. Voting rates
have historically depended on an array of demographic factors, and age is one of them. In
2012, the overall population turnout rate of 18 to 24 year-olds was 34.5% while that of 65
to 75 year olds  reached 60% (Current  Population Survey 2013).  As  a  result,  an older
community has an electoral built-in turnout advantage.
 
Figure 8 2012 registration and turnout rate by age group
13 As a consequence, the third reason that the Latino vote remains much weaker than its
total population numbers might suggest is that registration rates,  in spite of massive
registration drive efforts on the part of activists over the years, have remained extremely
low.  Since  1992  it  has  hovered  around  58%  and  never  exceeded  60%,  while  Euro-
Americans and African-Americans have registered at rates superior to 70%.
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Figure 9 Latino registration rate by presidential election year
14 This low registration rate is combined with an anemic turnout rate. The Latino turnout
rate has never gone over 50%. Latinos and Asians are the two groups that lag consistently
in  turnout  rate  when  compared  to  Anglos  or  African-Americans.  Moreover,  during
midterm elections, all groups suffer from a 20 point drop, and Latino turnout rates can
dip below 30%.
 
Figure 10 Turnout rate by racial/ethnic group
15 Combined, all these factors help explain why the Latino electorate is at a disadvantage
compared  to  Euro-Americans  and  African-Americans.  For  instance,  in  2012,  Latinos
lagged behind Euro-Americans and African-Americans in terms of both registration and
turnout rate among registered voters and eligible voters.8
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Figure 11 2012 electoral participation per ethno-racial group
16 Finally, one of the main reasons why the Latino electorate has had a moderate impact on
the  presidential  election  is  that  Latino  populations  are  highly  concentrated  in
uncompetitive states such as California and Texas. 
 
Figure 12 Latino population concentration per state, based on 2015 census estimates
17 This concentration has even more dire consequences in midterm elections. According to
Nate Cohn, in 2014, Latinos represented less than 5% of eligible voters in nine of the 10
most competitive Senate states, and about 2.4% of the people who actually voted. The
situation is  almost  as  problematic  in  the  House  of  Representatives  where half  of  all
Latinos live in just 65 of the nation’s 435 congressional districts.  Cohn estimated the
Latino population share of the eligible electorate in the 2014 House battlegrounds to be
7.4% (Cohn 2015).
18 Only a handful  of  swing states have Latino population that can have a real  electoral
impact during the presidential elections as the percentage of Latino voting age citizens is
superior  to  5%  in  only  three  traditional  battleground  states:  Nevada,  Colorado,  and
Florida.
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Figure13 Latino voting age population estimates in swing states, based on 2015 census estimates
 
3 - The Florida Exception
19 Nevada and Colorado have voted for  the Democratic  Party  in  each of  the last  three
presidential cycles but their electoral college votes only amount to 15. On the other hand,
Florida, with 29 Electoral College votes, is by far the largest swing state in which Latinos
can impact  the  presidential  election.  But  Florida  is  not  representative  of  the  Latino
population in the rest  of  the nation.  In 2016,  the Latino population of  the state was
composed,  roughly  speaking,  of  30% Cubans,  30% Porto  Ricans  and  30% other,  with
Mexican-Americans only accounting for about 10% (López and Stepler 2016). 
 
Figure 14 Florida Latino population breakdown by national ancestry, 2016
20 The overall trend, however, shows a decrease of the share of the Cuban population in the
Florida Latino population over the past 30 years.
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Figure 15 The changing composition of the Florida Latino population since 1990
21 This is important because Cubans and Puerto Ricans do not see immigration issues in the
same light as Mexican Americans.  Unlike foreign immigrants,  Puerto Ricans arrive as
citizens because of the island’s status as a US territory. As residents of the island, they
cannot vote in the general election, but once they relocate to a US state they can establish
residency and become registered to  vote.  Thanks to  the 1966 Cuban Adjustment  Act
almost all Cuban migrants have been admitted under a special parole power exercised by
the U.S. Attorney General that instantly grants them full legal status and puts them on a
path to U.S. citizenship. And historically speaking Cubans have supported the Republican
Party because of its tough position toward the Castro regime.9 For this reason the Florida
legislature is an exception in the Union because its Latino caucus is mostly republican. 
22 Moreover, Cubans have the highest turnout rate (67.1% in 2012) of all Latinos (Current
Population Survey 2013). By comparison the Mexican American turnout rate was 44% that
same year and 52.8% for Puerto Ricans. However, Cuban support for the Republican Party
has eroded over the years (Krogstad 2014). According to the national exit polls in 2004,
78% of Cuban Americans voted for George W. Bush, while in 2012, the Cuban vote in
Florida was split 49-47 between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. In 2016 the split seemed
to  continue  (Krogstad  and  Flores  2016).  This  drop  in  popularity  can  be  seen  in  the
evolution of partisan affiliation of registered Latinos.10
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Figure 16 Evolution of partisan affiliation of newly registered Latinos, 2006-2016
 
4 - Correlation Between Racial Polarization and
Partisan Polarization
23 Exit  polls  consistently  show  the  African  American  vote  to  be  around  90%  for  the
Democrats in presidential elections and the Latino Vote to hover around 70% for the same
party. At the same time African American and Latino voters consistently prefer voting for
a member of their own community. Because of the lack of diversity in the Republican
candidate field in most states, this “identity vote” is de facto a Democratic vote. For this
reason  Bruce  Cain  declared  that  racial  polarization  and  partisan  polarization  have
become “two sides of the same coin” (Cain, 2013).
24 What characterizes the Florida Democratic coalition is that it has both a large Latino
population and a large African American population. The following maps indicate that
there was a strong correlation between the percentage of Euro-Americans in a county and
Mitt Romney’s margin of victory in 2012. Obama won only one county in which the Anglo
population was superior to 79%. But he only won Monroe County by less than 200 votes.
The odds of Obama winning a county increased as the Anglo population got closer to 70%.
Obama got 70% of the vote in Gadsden County, his best result in the state, in a county that
was in 2010 36% Anglo.11
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Figure 17 Florida Anglo population concentration by county 2010 census
 
Figure 18 Florida presidential election results 2012 by county
25 Such obvious ethno-racial and partisan polarization has had tremendous consequences
since GOP operatives have used ethno-racial affiliation as a proxy for partisan affiliation.
As  in  other  states  controlled  by  Republicans,  the  decrease  in  the  popularity  of  the
Republican Party among Latinos in Florida has led the GOP to pass measures intended to
discourage minorities to go to the polls, with seemingly significant results (Herron and
Smith 2014). The correlation between partisan affiliation and ethnic/racial affiliation has
led the GOP to conclude that it was in its electoral interest to demobilize segments of the
electorate (Fox Piven et al. 2008; Haygood 2012; Levitt 2012; Gonzales 2012). On May 19,
2011,  Florida Governor Rick Scott signed into law Florida’s notorious House Bill  1355
which prevented ex-felons  from being able  to  cast  a  ballot  after  serving their  time,
cutting back early voting from fourteen to eight days,  and severely restricting voter
registration  drives  (Herron  and  Smith  2013).  Meanwhile,  the  state  conducted  a
controversial statewide voter purge that attempted to eliminate individuals not legally
entitled to cast a ballot from voter rolls (Ellement 2014). These measures were added on
top of a non-strict voter ID law on the books since 1977.12
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5 - 2016: The Actual Impact of the Latino Vote
26 In 2016, Hillary Clinton lost Florida by about 113,000 votes, that is 1.2% of state votes.
However, Florida ended up not being the most crucial state since even without Florida,
Donald Trump would still have reached 270 electoral votes because of his very narrow
margins  in  Wisconsin,  which  he  won  by  22,748  votes  (that  is  0.77%  of  the  votes),
Michigan, which he won by 10,704 votes (that is 0.22% of the votes) and Pennsylvania
which he won by 44,292 (that is 0.72% of the votes). In those states Latinos represented
3.6%, 3.1% and 4.5% of eligible voters. The Electoral College gives an enormous advantage
to swing states and it so happened that in 2016 the most crucial swing states where states
with small Latino populations. Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by almost 3 million
votes but received 224 Electoral College votes. To say it differently, she received 48% of
the vote but 42% of the Electoral College. On the other hand, Donald Trump received 46%
of the votes but 56% of the Electoral College votes (307).  In the most populous state,
California,  the  state  with  the  largest  Latino  population  of  the  Union,  she  won by  a
whopping 30% and received 4.3 million votes more than her opponent. In a winner-take-
all voting system, however, these votes do not count.
27 In 2016, the Republicans did not need the Latino vote to win.13 Yet, it was one of the
closest elections in the history of the nation and it probably could not be replicated. First
of all,  because the margins in Wisconsin,  Michigan and Pennsylvania were extremely
narrow and represented a worst-case-scenario breakdown of the Democrats’ “blue wall”.
Secondly, because the unpopularity of the Republican brand among Latinos is at an all-
time  low  and  may  not  improve  during  a  Trump  presidency  (Sargent  2016).  Finally,
because the Latino population in the US keeps increasing and by 2020 their presence
might shake up the electoral map. For instance, 31% of the population of Arizona was
estimated to be Latino in 2016, representing 21.5% of the electorate. Hillary Clinton lost
Arizona by 3.5% whereas Obama had lost it by almost 10% in 2012 and 2008. In the same
vein,  Clinton  lost  Texas,  a  non-competitive  state  where  none  of  the  candidates
campaigned and a state in which 28.1% of eligible voters in 2016 were Latinos, by less
than 10%. 10% is still a comfortable margin but an improvement from 2012 when Obama
lost by 16%. Making Texas, and its 36 Electoral College votes, competitive again has been
the Holy Grail for the Democratic Party for some time and it is not beyond the realms of
possibility. Since 2000, the fastest-growing segment of the Latino population has been in
southern  metropolitan  areas.  When  combined  with  the  African-American  vote,  this
growing  Latino  presence  already  helped  flip  Virginia  and  made  North  Carolina
competitive. So the argument that this demographic evolution is bound to benefit the
Democrats is still solid. It does not mean, however, that Democrats should take the Latino
vote for granted or clear the field for a historically unpopular Washington insider again. 
28 Exit polls estimated that 17% of voters in Florida in 2016 were Latinos, which of course is
probably too high considering that they represented only 18% of eligible voters.  The
problem with exit polls is that they are notoriously unreliable when it comes to Latinos.
As soon as the 2016 Exit Polls were released they were at the heart of a controversy
because they estimated that Latinos voted for Donald Trump at a rate of 28% while 66%
voted  for  Hillary  Clinton.14 The  polling  firm  Latino  Decisions,  co-founded  by  UCLA
professor Matt Barreto, estimated that only 18% of Latino voters chose the GOP in 2016
(Sanchez and Barreto 2016). This was confirmed by another study by Francisco Pedraza
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and  Bryan  Wilcox  Archuleta.  Using  Ecological  Inference  they  estimated  that  77%  of
Latinos in Texas voted for Hillary Clinton and 19% vote for Trump as opposed to the 61-34
split presented by Exit Polls in that state (Pedraza and Wilcox Archuleta 2016).  Their
study suggests that Latinos voted Democrat at a rate of 80% in Arizona, California and
Nevada.15
29 Before  the  election  a  Pew  Research  Center  polls  also  showed  that  the  Republican
candidate would receive less than 20% of the votes and that support number was actually
a dreadful 15% among Latino Millennials (Lopez et al. 2016).
 
Figure 19 Pew Research Center Poll August-September 2016
30 What these numbers suggest  is  that  the Republican brand,  or  at  least  the particular
candidate in 2016, was especially unpopular among young Latinos. As a consequence the
future of the GOP among the next generation of voters is rather bleak. Furthermore, this
rejection of the GOP by Latino youth indicates that the pattern of partisan polarization
among Latinos might actually increase. Latinos do not vote Democrats at rates close to
that of the African Americans but these polls and 2016 voting pattern analyses, along with
the overall tone of the message by Donald Trump towards the Latino community, suggest
that Latinos might feel repulsed by the GOP at the national level, which should, but may
not necessarily, benefit the Democrats. 
 
Conclusion
31 In an extremely tight 2016 presidential election the Latino vote does not appear to have
been determinant. Nonetheless, demographics indicate that while being limited by high
geographic concentration, low citizenship rates and low registration and turnout rates,
the potential of the Latino vote is as strong as ever. In some states the Latino electorate
cannot be ignored. At the national level, courting the Latino vote is poised to extend the
electoral map and is still the best long-term calculation for the major parties. Alienating
them is getting riskier with each election cycle and political context will determine how
long the current GOP can survive on an electoral base that has been dangerously reduced.
16 If immigration reform is as central an issue as some scholars have observed, the very
uncertainty surrounding the future of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) and
Deferred  Action  for  Parents  of  Americans  and  Lawful  Permanent  Residents  (DAPA),
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coupled with the national outcry surrounding Donald Trump’s first executive order on
immigration and his subsequent plummeting approval ratings so early in his presidency
(Agiesta 2017), does not bode well for the Republican Party and may well undermine its
hope to regain popularity among the fastest growing segment of the American electorate.
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NOTES
1. I give the word ethno-racial the same meaning as historian David Hollinger in his description
of the ethno-racial pentagon. David Hollinger, Post-Ethnic America, New York: Basic Books, 1995.
According to  the  Directive  15  of  the  Office  of  Management  and Budget,  the  Hispanic/Latino
census category is an ethnic and not a racial category. However, from a practical standpoint, this
category works as a racial category, especially in the field of public policies aimed at monitoring
and fighting discrimination. 
2. It is more complicated to talk about an Asian community in the US because of this lack of
internal unifying factors such as a common language or a common history of colonization. 
3. The very expression Latin America conveys this sense of commonality. 
4. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/00
5. Current Population Survey 2016, Table 4.b. “Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race
and Hispanic Origin, for States: November 2016”. The total Latino population was estimated to
reach 39 million out of which 26.6 millions were citizens.
6. Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2016, Census Bureau, May 102017, https://
www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2017/05/voting_in_america.html
7. People born in Puerto Rico are not considered foreign-born.
8. Eligible voter population includes people over 18 years old but excludes felons barred from
voting.
9. This is consistent over the years in opinion polls, Guillermo J. Grenier and Hugh Gladwin, 2016
FIU Cuba Poll, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/2016-cuba-poll.pdf
10. Florida  Department  of  State,  Election  Division,  Bookclosing  Report  –  Regular,  http://
dos.myflorida.com/elections/data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/bookclosing/
bookclosing-reports-regular/;The  registration  numbers  for  2016  are  as  of  October  18  2016,
http://dos.myflorida.com/media/697212/2016general_partyrace.pdf
11. This  correlation  held  in  2012  in  other  southern  swing  states  such  as  Virginia  or  North
Carolina where Obama polled lower among Euro-Americans than his national average of 39% but
he won Florida, Virginia and made North Carolina competitive.
12. A recent working paper studied elections from 2008-2012 and found that Latino turnout was
10.3% lower in states with strict  photo identification requirements than in other states.  The
authors also found that the participation gap between eligible Latino and white voters increased
from 5.3% to 11.9% in states with strict photo identification requirements. Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita
Lajevardi,  and  Lindsay  Nielson,  “Voter  Identification  Laws  and  the  Suppression  of  Minority
Voters,  ”  Working  Paper,  University  of  California,  San  Diego,  2015,  http://pages.ucsd.edu/
~zhajnal/page5/documents/voterIDhajnaletal.pdf
13. Some might argue that the Latino vote played a role locally because the election was so tight.
For instance, in Michigan the Latino turnout rate was 70% in 2012 for a total of 158,000 votes
while it dropped to 36% in 2016 for a total of 74,000 votes. Or in Florida where the Latino turnout
rate reached 62% in 2012 but only 54% in 2016 (Current Population Survey, 2017).
14. http://edition.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls
15. Even without using ecological reference one can be suspicious of exit polls number just by
looking at homogeneous precincts, that is precincts that are at least 90% Latino, to get a rough
estimation.
16. During the 1980 presidential elections, the share of the Anglo vote was 88%. In 2012 it was
72%.
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ABSTRACTS
Much has been written about the Latino community and its role in American politics. Yet there
remain some misconceptions. While they have become the largest ethno-racial minority in the
country  their  political  impact  has  remained  limited  at  the  national  level  due  to  their
geographical  concentration,  low rate  of  citizenship  and registration  and even lower  turnout
rates. Yet, demographics suggest they probably hold the key to the electoral future of the two
major parties. In 2016 Donald Trump was elected president in spite of harsh anti-Latino rhetoric.
However his election was exceptional on many levels. Alienating the Latino community remains
a dangerous gamble for the GOP in the long term because it could lead to more ethno-racial and
partisan polarization that may hamper its electoral prospects.
INDEX
Mots-clés: vote latino, électorat latino, polarisation partisane, polarisation raciale, élections
présidentielles 2016, Floride
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